Can CCC CEO Silverstone be believed?

Cable issued by HMAS Adelaide : October 10

It's difficult to believe CCC CEO Brigadier Silverstone's story of events in the "Children Overboard" scandal.

Brigadier Silverstone is central to the disputed evidence which changed the course of history in Australia that essentially gave John Howard an extra term in Government.

Excluding exculpatory evidence, selective quoting of evidence and not having the right to cross-examine your accusers puts the accused at a great disadvantage - all techniques (and powers) exploited by the CCC. Here is an excerpt from the Senate Report - to make the point!

Initial report

3.52 It is uncontroversial that the original report that a child had been thrown overboard was conveyed by Brigadier Silverstone to Air Vice Marshal Alan Titheridge, Head, Strategic Command Division and to Rear Admiral Geoffrey Smith, Maritime Commander, on the morning of 7 October 2001.[198] Brigadier Silverstone made this report, believing himself to be passing on information that he had just been told in a telephone conversation with Commander Banks.
3.53 There is, however, disagreement between Commander Banks and Brigadier Silverstone about a number of aspects of their telephone conversation, including whether Commander Banks ever said that a child had been thrown overboard.
3.54 According to Brigadier Silverstone, he spoke with Commander Banks at 7.20am Darwin (‘India-Kilo’) time on 7 October 2001. The time difference between Darwin and the Adelaide was then two and half hours, meaning that, on Brigadier Silverstone’s account, the time on the Adelaide (‘Golf’ time) would have been 4.50am. The conversation lasted for less than five minutes[199] and conveyed to him the following information:
the vessel had disabled its steering, and was dead in the water 7-8 nautical miles south;
there was a threat of mass exodus;
there were men in the water and a child thrown over the side, 5,6 or 7 years of age;
some had discarded their life jackets, but to the best of CO Adelaide’s knowledge everyone had been recovered.[200]
3.55 Brigadier Silverstone told the Committee that both his contemporaneous notes and his recollection of the conversation confirm this account.
3.56 The contention between Brigadier Silverstone and Commander Banks with regard to their recollections of this conversation is focused on two matters. They are, first, the time at which the conversation took place and, second, whether Commander Banks said that a child had been thrown over the side.

Time of telephone conversation

3.57 In relation to the first issue, the time of 0720 (7.20am) is noted at the top of Brigadier Silverstone’s diary notes of the conversation. However, the Brigadier informed the Committee that he had only inserted that notation of the time three to four days after the conversation, ‘when it became apparent that this was the subject of some interest’.

[201] Questioned as to how he could be confident that that was the correct time, Brigadier Silverstone said:
I had a requirement to pass the latest information to Air Vice Marshal Titheridge by 0730 Darwin time that morning and I had previously arranged with CO Adelaide to talk to him at 0720 in order to get a report on what was happening.

Senator Brandis - And you met that deadline to speak to Air Vice Marshal Titheridge by 0730am?

Brigadier Silverstone - Indeed. My recollection is of sitting there at about 0728. I called him at that time and then called Rear Admiral Smith directly after that.

[202]

3.58 To set against this confidence, however, is the problem that if the phone call took place at that time, then the events which formed its content do not seem, according to the Adelaide’s boarding logs, to have yet taken place.
3.59 Commander Banks testified that, to the best of his recollection, the conversation occurred at about 6.00am his time, and thus at 8.30am in Darwin time.[203]
3.60 The discrepancies between the two sets of recollections and reconstructions of the time of the phone call were extensively canvassed by the Committee in its hearings.[204] The main features of the evidence which support each version of events are outlined below.
3.61 The following considerations speak in favour of Commander Banks’s account of the time:
the Adelaide’s boarding log contains no entries at around 4.50am which refer to persons in the water or recovery of SUNCs from the water, whereas the entries at around 6.00am refer to both those things;[205] at around 6.00am, according to a boarding log entry and subsequent witness statements from the crew, a child was being held over the side of SIEV 4 and being threatened with being thrown overboard;[206]
Commander Banks testified that he only recalled one telephone call with Brigadier Silverstone which involved reference to a child, and that this call occurred at the time that the child was being held over the side;[207] a statement made on 10 October 2001 by the Adelaide’s Principal Warfare Officer, Lieutenant Commander Daniel Hynes, reports on the incident of a child held over the side a few minutes prior to 6.00am. It continues: ‘The adult then brought the child inboard after a few minutes when it was evident that the SUNCs that were jumping in the water were being returned. At this time I moved into the bridge where the Commanding Officer was on the phone to the Brigadier, where I heard him state quite clearly that the SUNCs were throwing themselves overboard and threatening to throw a child in the water in an attempt to cause a SOLAS [safety of life at sea] situation’.[208]
Commander Banks’s statement made on 11 October 2001 concerning his telephone conversation with Brigadier Silverstone uses the present tense in relation to his report of a child being held over the side. This gives support to Commander Banks’s recollection that the phone call happened as he was witnessing the incident. The statement reads, in part, ‘I believe I told him [Silverstone] that they were threatening to throw children overboard and I had witnessed such an event. I believe the CJTF asked me to confirm that children were involved and I believe I advised him that I could see a young child being held over the side. I believe he asked me some questions about this and could I definitely confirm this. I am positive I stated that quote I had seen it myself unquote’. At the end of the statement, Commander Banks summarised: ‘I advised CJTF 639 ... that I could see a man threatening to put a child over the side’ [emphasis added].[209]
3.62 Finally, the Committee notes that at 4.50am, the sun had not yet risen at the Adelaide’s position. Commander Banks told the Committee that the boarding party was inserted in darkness (between 4.39am and 4.42am),[210] and Brigadier Silverstone noted that, at 4.50am, first light would have been ‘10 or 15 minutes away’.[211] Sunrise did not take place until 5.39am.[212] This fact seems difficult to reconcile with the claim that Commander Banks or his crew would have been able to see sufficiently well to specify the age of any child, at 4.50am, as 5, 6 or 7 years old.

The relevant chapter of the Senate Report can be downloaded here.